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The Care of Defective Neonates, 
Ethics Committees and Federal Intervention 
Peter J. Riga 
Professor Riga is affiliated with the South Texas College of Law in 
Houston. 
Introduction 
As the technological abilities of modern medicine get more sophisti-
cated, the problems of defective fetuses and neonates will become 
lllore troublesome.! While the idea that a woman may legally and 
lllorally abort her children found to be probably defective through 
llnniocentesis enjoys widespread popularity among Americans, now 
the question to be faced is whether the logic of this mentality has 
begull to spread to . those children who, while defective, manage in 
lOme way to be born. 2 
There are other problems in. this delicate area as well. We have had 
the case of the killing .of one of a set of twins found to be defective 
•hUe the other was permitted to live; a selection of sex gender with its 
evident dangers; the development of fetal operations which can 
:_rrect many abnormalities thought previously to be unavoidable, etc. 
&ue latter case poses acute problems for the abortion mentality since 
~-- the fetus is treated as an independent patient and to that extent, 
• COnsidered a human being. And what of the techonology of receding 
the time of viability from six months to five-and-a-half months or even 
l!arlier? What becomes of court decisions in the abortion cases and the 
~ion of state interest?4 This problem was considered by the minor-
~ Opinion in the most recent abortion decision of the U.S. Supreme 
urt (Akron). 
It should also be noted that the questions which follow are hard 
~ions of law and ethics and no clear and ready answers or solu-
tions will be available for the doctor, other medical personnel, ethics 
110Jnrnittees, etc. What is imperative, however, is that we approach the 
'lllestion with a profound respect for all human life, the parents as 
255 
well as the defective children. If we are going to act like C 
should act like God with compassion, justice, and equality . P1 
serious dialogue can begin with the widespread use of eth1 
mittees which has now been recognized by the federal governrr~ 
The Cases 
I 
In the case of In re Mueller, a set of Siamese twins w: 
allegedly denied food and oxygen at their parents' request cam 
attention of the courts.5 The deformed twins were born May , 
1







to a Danville Illinois physician and his wife. The twins were fo l' :i by a 
judge on Ju~e 5, 1981, to be neglected children but, curiot~ y, the 
same judge found no neglect on the part of the parents who • 1ew or 
should have known what was happening to their children in 1 ,e hos-
pital. Someone was responsible for withholding ordinary f< 1d and 
drink in a situation which was far from ethically clear. 6 
The state took temporary custody of the sons of Dr . . -tobert 
Mueller and his wife, Pamela Schopp, when a social worker, al ing 0 ? 
an anonymous call, visited Lakeview Medical Center an~ fm•nd ~Vl~ 
dence of neglect. In fact, what she found was that the S1ame. " twm 
were denied food and drink to the point where their ribs W•: re pro-
truding. 7 In effect, they were being allowed to starve. 
The twins were joined at the waist and shared three leg<; . More 
ominously for their future, they shared a common digestive s~stem 
and some vital organs.s While custody was being decided, the childr~n 
were examined and cared for at Children's Memorial Hospital. m 
Chicago, to determine whether . they could ~e separated. Med~c~ 
experts gave a negative prognosis for separatiOn. In fact, the fm 
resolution of the case indicated that no one was responsible for ~be 
neglect since the parents were finally awarded custody of t he twms 
who were permitted to be taken home. 
The ethical and legal issues here are momentous since there are n~ 
recorded cases in which either parents or physicians have been h~l 
civilly or criminally liable for failure to maintain children born with 
.. ill'gto either defects or conditions such that the parents are unw m .d 
live with them. In a sense, what we have in these cases is the other SI : 
of the coin of the Phillip Becker case where a young Down's syndromts 
· h en 12-year-old boy was refused corrective heart surgery by t e par 
and this was upheld by the California courts for no other reason than 
that the boy was retarded.9 The difference is that in the Mu eller casd 
the defect was detected immediately at birth and the attempte 
remedy was a sort of post-natal abortion. This practice is not new • as 
we shall soon' see_ Involuntary euthanasia <:>n defe~tiv~ neo~a~e: :~ 
been going on for well over a decade at varwus umvers1ty cllmc. f 
hospitals. It is only recently that it has been brought to the not ice ~e 
public authorities. Some legal and moral standards, therefore, must 
256 Linacre QuarterlY 
set up for treating or not treating such children. The case of Infant 
Doe from Bloomington, Indiana, was factually similar. 10 
In this latter case, a severely retarded Down's syndrome child was 
allowed to die by denying it the elemental human demands of food 
. · and drink. It was originally the decision of her parents which the 
appellate courts of Indiana refused to stay or prevent. The child died 
of dehydration and starvation before the. U.S. Supreme Court could 
intervene. The legal question is not "moot" but is precedent in 
Indiana. But because there was no opinion in the case, it is difficult to 
know exactly for what the case stands. 
The facts seem to show that Infant Doe was not dying at all. If the 
child was dying and was beyond the scope of the healing process, as 
we shall explain, then there would have been no legal or moral prob-
lem. As with all the dying, we would then withdraw the useless tech-
nology of medicine, make the patient as comfortable as possible, and 
let nature take its course. The cause of death would be the patholog-
ical condition of the patient for which we can do nothing further, not 
the removal of medicine or technology. The lawyer for the parents at 
first claimed that the child had only a "50/50 chance of survival" with 
a simple operation to open a fistula which was blocking the esophagus. 
In fact, under questioning, he admitted that this figure was incorrect 
and that Infant Doe "could have surgery with more than an even 
chance of success" according to expert medical testimony. In sum, it 
aeems that Infant Doe was allowed to dehydrate and starve to death 
because she was retarded. Under those circumstances, parents and 
their doctors decided to "let nature take its course." This was, in 
reality, a twist in the evident meaning of the English language. If o~e 
Withdraws food and drink from any child, it will die and the cause will 
be the refusal, not "nature." As little information as possible was 
liven by all concerned - lawyers, parents, hospital personnel and 
authorities - which seems strange under the circumstances, given the 
notoriety which the case received nationally. If~ as claimed, there were 
two acceptable medical procedures open to the parents, one of which 
was nontreatment why was this fact not made clear from the onset? The 
Ieason, however, seems to be clear: for the first time in the history of 
the United States, an · appellate court justified out-and-out euthanasia 
for the sole reason that the subject was retarded. Since Infant Doe 
died of dehydration and starvation, the withholding of food and drink 
was the direct cause of death. 
· In October, 1973, an article appeared entitled "Moral and Ethical 
Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery."ll The authors reported that 
lOme 43 (14 percent) of the 249 consecutive infant deaths at the Yale 
University School of Medicine special care nursery were related to 
Withholding treatment. The parents and physicians in a joint decision 
decided that the infants' prognosis for meaningful life was very poor 
lllld therefore treatment was to be rejected. The standards used by the 
' 
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medical clinic were not explained by the article. 
In an earlier case, Maine Medical Center v. Houle, 12 a male fant 
was born without a left eye and a left ear, with a deformed lef 1and 
and a tracheoesophageal fistula. Without surgical repair (a :inor 
operation), the infant would die. The parents were informed an they 
directed the physician not to operate on the child and to w l hold 
feedings and intravenous fluids. The Center petitioned t he ·t ate 
superior court for a temporary restraining order to maintain ntra· 
venous feedings . pending the court's ruling on the question of r .·gical 
intervention. The child developed seizures which were interpr" ed as 
brain damage. The court granted the restraining order and order· d the 
parents not to interfere with the efforts of the physicians to p• ·form 
surgery; to do so would constitute child neglect. The pedia<rician 
notified the court of the severity of the prognosis and the condi; H.m of 
the child. The judge ruled that "the issue is not the prospective 1.:; ~tality 
of life to be preserved." Houle held that the evaluation (i.e., t he value 
to be assigned to this life or any life) is beyond the scope of a 1Jhysi-
cian's medical expertise beca~se "quality of life" judgmei<-.s are 
beyond the physician's medical expertise, and that withholding 
consent to the operation would constitute "neglect" on the part of 
the parents. In the words of the court: "The most basic right enj oyed 
by every human being is the right to life itself." The court acted as 
parens patriae, appointed a guardian to consent to surgery, and 
enjoined the parents from interfering from any future medical t reat-
ment. The infant died on Feb. 24, 197 4. 
In this case, as well as in the Mueller, Infant Doe, and Becker cases, 
the parents were particularly angered over interference in "a strictly 
private and familial matter." The matters of family privacy and 
parental decision-making are, of course, principles of good law and 
ethics generally. But it seems that the above cited cases, while few, 
should warn us that more is involved here than just these principles: 
who speaks for the defective child who has an independent right to 
life? With regard to these cases, the following remarks are in order. 
n 
First of all, in each of these cases,. we are not in a Roe situation 
since all of these children have been born and, presumably, have met 
the constitutional requirement for personhood with full rights, includ-
ing a right to life. Leaving the fate of such persons to the interested 
discretion of parents and doctors can be seen as an arbitrary denial of 
due process and equal protection. What is at work, at least in these 
few cases, is a quality-of-life argument decided by interested parents 
and doctors, for which there is little legal precedent. We are not deal-
ing here with a "prolongation of dying" of terminally ill patients, but 
with children who will have a diminished human capacity. 
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Secondly, any legal response to this question of involuntary eutha-
nasia depends on our expectations of what law can and should accom-
plish in this situation. 13 Any such determination in the final analysis 
can only be made by the broader determination of law as public 
policy made by a legislature or by the people themselves: Are these 
defective children a definable class? Are certain instances of with-
holding treatment morally justified or soc.ially desirable and who is to 
make this decision fairly and impartially after a consideration of all 
the facts? What criteria or standards should be established to define 
such a Class? Legal rules must focus on criteria, procedures, and deci-
sion-making processes for implementing a social policy in this area of 
involuntary passive euthanasia. These legal-ethical questions must be 
answered before we can begin to think about a legal or social policy or 
a juridical determination. Due process is a legal as well as a moral 
obligation to every person, irrespective of whether he or she is capable 
of invoking this right. This right exists in the face of government and 
every other person, parents included. 
These cases involve hard questions of social policy which must be 
faced by the legislature. Failure to do so not only makes the work of 
COurts necessary but also confusing, as the case law in this area has 
clearly shown. Failure by the legislature to establish public policy in 
this area also contributes to lack of objective standards to be followed 
by parents, hospitals and medical personnel. 
When dealing with defectivE1 neonates, it is truly difficult to give 
ceneral rules and standards. Standards in general there must be, but 
more important still are the values and intent of the <jecision-makers. 
So many of these cases are so borderline, that is, in a gray area, that 
leneral rules are inapplicable and some discretion must be left to 
doctors, parents and other decision-makers for truly borderline cases 
•here refusal of treatment is not due solely to the handicapped condi-
tion of the child. Herein lies the heart of this problem. 
Thirdly, it should also be clear that the right to privacy simply 
cannot be asserted by a whole group of parents of defective neonates 
1rhen the rights of other citizens (their children) are possibly being 
undermined and destroyed without due process. Thus, some general 
Plesumptions and objective criteria must be set up to insure a fair and 
impartial application, wh~re the subjects of rights (children) can give 
no consent to their own treatment and a substituted consent of some 
form must be found. We shall try to outline these standards in the 
final section of this paper. 
Substituted consent for these defective neonates is really a mis-
nomer. There is no possibility of finding what they would want, were 
!Jley able to see and understand their present condition. We are deal-
Ing with persons who will lead, at best, diminished lives as in the 
8aikewicz case,14 but for whom treatment will prolong th~ir lives. 
'I'herefore, it is crucial to understand that any election not to treat 
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defective neonates outside of the "poor medical prognosis" co ·xt, is 
really based on a "quality of life" determination which is esst. ·ally a 
question Of SOcial and, therefore, legislative policy. It is also a , 'JStion 
of value choice, of the meaning of death and life, a question ··yond 
the competence per se of any medical or hospital personnel. 
It may well be that, as a society, we will decide not to treat ,rtain, 
well-defined classes of persons (severely retarded, senile; etc. ut the 
legal and moral guidelines and standards should be reasonai well-
defined and the circumstances rather clear where treatment wr ·1ot be 
refused except in the most hopeless medical cases.15 It may well 
be that our society is actually afraid to articulate such guideli s for a 
variety of reasons and is therefore willing to consign these ca$ either 
to the private discretion of some (e.g., parents and doctors) ( to the 
courts. The difficulty with this is that, in the former solutio n e are 
left without clearly defined standards so that neonates are ~.:- ven no 
fundamental due process which will fairly safeguard their rig. t to life, 
while the latter solution has led to judicial confusion concen . mg the 
standards to be applied in similar cases.1s 
Questions Might Be Asked 
For example, in the cases of defective newborns, some cour t s might 
seek to ask, as the Quinlan court did, what the newborn would decide 
(substitute consent) were he capable of doing so.17 Yet, we might 
want to ask why a defective infant might want to die. First of all, this 
is already a false question because, besides the miracule dictu or fanci-
ful nature of the answer' we are m grave danger of imposing o ur own 
values upon the child who has absolutely no basis for the fears and 
horrors we might have for ourselves in a similar state. We project our 
values onto the child by this quality of life argument. The funda-
mental error here is that this proposition presupposes, first, a higher 
level of health, consciousness, awareness, etc., and then a degeneration 
from this state. By definition, this state is, and has always been, absent 
from the defective newborn who might well be happy and sat isfied to 
live out his limited human potential, having never realized what he is 
missing. This can only be realized by those who have in fact recog-
nized the higher levels of intelligence .and human co~sciousn~ss and 
who now project their potential lack or loss on those who never had it 
in the first place. We are in grave danger of confusing our suffering 
(physician, parents, judge, general public) with that of the child who 
has never known any other existence and who, for all we know, would 
be perfectly cotttent to live as he or she is. In fact, it is well-known 
that many of these handicapped children are capable of giving and 
receiving love and generally taking care of themselves. In protected or 
sheltered environments, many of them even lead productive lives. But 
all this becomes a basic question in classical public policy of how far, 
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• a society, do we wish to revere, treat and protect such people. 18 
'Ibis fanciful projection in the · Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions made 
those decisions less credible. 
While Karen Quinlan, of course, was not retarded from birth as was 
. 'Saikewicz, the relation between the two cases is that in both, the 
patients were incapable of exercising their own right of privacy and 
courts had to find a way of doing it for the.m. They used "substituted 
consent" for this purpose. 
In all of this discussion, perhaps it can be stated differently again: 
the fact is that we have never known what it is to be of such dimin-
ished capacity as never to. have known any other life. That makes it 
impossible for us to change places with both groups, i.e ., those who 
Dever had the capacity in the first place and those who, like Karen 
Quinlan, had it and then lost it. 
Fourth, it is noteworthy that there are correlations between 
parental acceptance of their handicapped children and such factors as 
religion, social class and the presence of supportive friends and rela-
tives. As one expert put it: "But parents learn to value and love their 
children as they live with them." 19 In any case, there is no clear or 
COnvincing reason why a diminished future should bother the person 
lrho has known no other level of life. What it does is disturb other 
Jleople, such as parents and doctors. There are certainly no convincing 
llRUments for this alternative of dealing with the problem so far 
advanced by those who want to kill them "for their own good" or, 
1Vbat amounts to the same thing, not to treat them as they would 
other "normal" children or adults similarly situated and thus "allow 
them to die." 
More to the point, as a society we should be terribly skeptical about 
l strong group (parents and doctors) who want to kill, or not treat, or 
do away with a weaker group (defective newborns) "for their own 
IOod," simply because they are handicapped. History is too replete 
1rith such examples to take this argument very seriously either as a 
lllatter of law or of public policy. In the words of P. Foot: " With 
children who are born with Down's Syndrome it is, however, quite 
different [than children soon to die] . Most of these are able to live on 
for quite awhile in a reasonably contented way, remaining like chil-
dren all of their lives but ~pable of affectionate relationships and able 
to play games and perform simple tasks. The fact is, of course,that the 
doctors who recommend against life-saving procedures for handi-
capped infants are usually thinking not of them, but rather of their 
Plrents, and of other children in the family, or of the 'burden on 
IOciety ' if the children survive. So it is not for their sake but to avoid 
trouble to others that they are allowed to die." 20 
Fifth, the easiest cases to decide in this area are those children 
1rbose "medical prognosis is wretchedly bad," and who would die in a 
'-Y short time no matter what we would do. When this basic medical 
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decision or prognosis is made in good faith and according to _pted 
medical standards, all support systems, including I.V. (outsid £' · those 
necessary for the comfort of the child), may be legally and orally 
discontinued since such a procedure no longer has any human .aning 
or significance (e.g., anencephalic newborns). One is not obligat to do 
the fut ile or to continue the useless; neither are we obligatee o take 
disproportionate measures to continue a life which would b me of 
constant pain. " Primum non nocere. " This was the basic cone • ·ion of 
the Quinlan court as it set up the procedure to be followed · such 
cases without further judicial intervention and it can be applie•· to the 
situation of defective neonates as well. 21 It should be noted, r •wever, 
that even in these cases of dying neonates, fundamental nutrit 1ts and 
water are part of the comfort of the patient and should ··1 ot be 
removed simply to hasten the moment of death. They 1.1ay be 
removed, however, in situations where their administration is part of 
the pain condition itself or where they plainly prolong dea tl1 while 
doing no real good for the patient. Discretion here lies with t he medi-
cal personnel. 
More Difficult Cases Exist 
But there are the much more difficult cases of mentally and /or 
physically defective persons who will live diminished lives, but from 
whom accepted and comparatively simple procedur~s have been with-
held so that they are " allowed to die, " when those procedures could 
have prolonged their admittedly limited lives, as seems to be the situa-
tion in the Mueller and Infant Doe cases. This was the object ive of 
Public Law 504 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973). What fair criter ia can be 
set up in such cases to distinguish the three cases- the prolongat ion 
of dying cases, the refusal of treatment based principally on m ental or 
physical retardation, and the cases in the gray or ambiguous area? 
The problem to be faced in these tragic situations is both m oral and 
legal. The moral question is, " What category of patients do we - as a 
society - simply not wish to treat?" The answer we are beginning to 
receive, at least in the cases of defective neonates cited above, is that 
since their " quality" of life ·is so bad (and since there are no defined 
standards, this term is anything the decision-maker wants it to mean), 
they should be allowed to die. We are beginning to see a subtle erosion 
away from the presumption of life for these children to one against 
them. Moral questions simply cannot be shirked by a society and these 
categories of human beings (the senile aged, the severely mentally and 
physically handicapped neonates) will simply not go away. Given our 
sophisticated technology, their number will, in fact, increase. 
In addition, there is an important legal question here which follows 
hard on the moral question. What is happening in the courts in the feW 
cases handed down concerning defective persons is : 1) such defective 
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children are not being treated the same as other " normal" children in 
the same situation (Becker, Mueller, Infant Doe and possibly Baby 
lane Doe); and 2) the standard used in these cases by t hose who are 
basically interested parties is subjective and dangerous ("quality of 
life") for these groups themselves. It is disturbingly clear in these few 
cases that it is the courts themselves which are therefore creating great 
protection difficulties in the way they are treating these people .22.2a 
What should be clear at once is that parents and their physicians 
alone cannot be trusted to make such decisions for such defective 
human beings. Both of these groups have a significant conflict of 
interests which impairs their judgment negatively in a life and death 
lituation, such as in the Mueller case, where decisions affecting the 
children must be made comparatively soon after birth. The parents' 
interest may well be to save their own psychological and economic life 
II well as that, perhaps, of their own children, past and future. Such 
children may be a burden to their parents, but in that case, this would 
lllake the parents bad decision-makers, under the circumstances. Simi-
larly, the physician is usually more affected by those whose feelings 
are most visible and tangible - the parents - if he or she is to be a 
very objective articulator of the child's interest. What physicians are 
lluly capable of doing is to give an honest and complete evaluation of 
the situation and, if certain agreed upon standards are met (cf. infra ), 
then parents and doctors, as fundamental decision-makers, can pro-
ceed legally and morally. 
In fact, most physicians in various studies tend not to want to treat 
a!ch infants since they represent a failure for the physicians or at 
least, most physicians consider such infants better off dead - even 
though some parents do not share views of their physicians, yet they 
Dever say so. 24 If these studies are correct, then we have a significant 
Jll'oblem where some treating physicians believe in the loose thinking 
of the "quality of life" theory without the guidance of some objective 
ltandards. The dangers implicit in such a situation are obvious, partic-
ularly for purposes of due process for these neonates. 
Who, then, can be trusted with such decisions? The Quinlan deci-
lion at least provided some protection for incompetents in a pro-
longed dying situation by a diffusion of decision-making representing 
a Bocietal consensus (ethics committee) . And, by analogy, the same 
ft!asoning may be applied to newborn defective children who are in 
the same situation: while acknowledging the parents as appropriate 
llardians, and protecting their right to participate in the cessation of 
llledically useless treatment, the court stated that such a decision would 
be legally valid only if it had the approval of a hospital ethics commit-
tee. Whatever one thinks of the final function of such a committee, it 
does introduce the recognition of the impermissibility of physician(s) 
IDd family making such important decisions alone, with no protection 
for the helpless child. In other words, this method of decision diffu-
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sion is not to be construed as an unwillingness to assume P· :;anal 
responsibility on the part of parents and physicians, but rat h( as an 
incipient effort to reach some form of societal consensus o . these 
edges of life issues and to take them out of exclusive hands c those 
(parents, physicians) who have a negat ive vested interest in tl case. 
This would fit in well with Professor Robertson 's suggestion t l -t , for 
the most ex treme cases, society, through the legislature or ,JurtS, 
should recognize certain objective criteria where treatmen t an be 
refused: " But, just as authoritative and specific criteria have en :d the 
physician 's determination of when brain death has occurred , t l ~ risks 
of delegating treatment to parents, physicians, or committees ·an be 
similarly lessened if specific. criteria are developed to describ <: defec· 
tive characteristics in the familial or institutional situations in which 
treatment may be withheld from defective infants." 25 If sue stan· 
dards are established, an ethics committee might well prove use ul. We 
shall develop the notion of ethics committees a little further tn this 
study. In any case, what Professor RobE;!rtson is arguing for .> both 
objective criteria of what standards are to be used for when to treat 
and not to treat, at least in general. This would also be in itself a form 
of due process as well. 
Perhaps this is as far as we can go. Perhaps, to openly ackn wledge 
that we are willing to treat the retarded, the senile or severely defec· 
tive neonates differently from the " normal" patient is so offensive to 
society's view of the equality of citizens that its explicit knowledge is 
impossible. We then need to rationalize a way to treat them differ· 
ently, and the notion of substituted judgment seems to be one such 
invention by the courts. And yet, if we can establish some minimal 
standards which will justify refusal or removal of treatment, perhaps 
this would be as far as we can go with rules. In this sense , ethics 
committees can be invaluable at arriving at such a societal m oral con· 
sensus. While it should be noted that a " societal moral consensus" is 
not necessarily objectively correct, what such a consensus does do in a 
democracy is to take that decision out of the hands of a few int erested 
parties. The process has, I believe, fewer abuses. 
Necessity of Proper Information 
Finally, it would also seem part of 'the legal obligation of informed 
consent by the parents that they be objectively and fully informed of 
the possibility of taking many of the defective newborns home and 
having a wholesome - at least in some cases- familial experience. 
Recent studies have shown this to be much more prevalent t han pre-
viously suspected, either by physicians or by the general public. A_s 
another expert has put it: " Those who have lived with the handi· 
capped seem to reject any necessary incompatibility between being 
handicapped and leading a worthwhile life, a conclusion that ought to 
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be taken into account by those charged with making decisions about 
the 'right to life' of infants with birth defects. " 26 The story of such 
parents has yet to be written and told. 
The real problem in this area is how to restrict legally a refusal to 
treat the extreme cases, which many thoughtful physicians believe do 
· · exist. 
The AMA Judicial Council has tried to deal with the most extreme 
of these cases: " A decision whether to treat a severely defective infant 
and exert maximal efforts to sustain life" should be left to the 
parentS. No one could quarrel with this, as long as the parents are fully 
informed of all the possibilities, and the decision is restricted to a very 
narrow category of cases . But this is not what is happening in this 
field. Outside of " maximal care," we have rather simple medical pro-
cedures being refused in order to bring about death and, as in the 
Mueller and Infant Doe cases, the withholding of ordinary food and 
drink for the seemingly sole reason of physical and mental handicap. 
It is these latter hard cases which cause all the legal and moral prob-
lems. We need some clear procedures in this painful area. In fact, the 
AMA guidelines of 1975 simply abandon the field to the exclusive 
decision of the parents which, as we have seen, cannot be conceded by 
any society dedicated to due process. 
III 
. The following legal standards will help minimize the risks to others 
(e.g., medical personnel, hospitals, the parents themselves), but still, 
the real danger here is the outgrowth of measures already morally and 
legany accepted in our society against defective human life which is 
unborn. It seems only a small but logical step to correct what we 
lllissed only a short tiine before. In fact, this has been suggested by 
aome doctors and experts in the field. 27 As we have mentioned, this is 
not a direct problem of law, but of society's attitude toward defective 
human life, which then comes to affect the law. Once we start down 
this road of justifying the taking of any human life, for whatever 
reason, it is difficult to control its logical application to those who 
have managed to be born defectively. 
Even after the few cases relating to defective neonates are carefully 
ex_amined, there emerge few clear and sure guidel~es for ethics com-
lllittees, physicians and parents to follow in knowmg when to treat or 
not treat. The following guidelines are legal and moral, garnered from 
lOme of the cases, as well as from good medical practice, which can be 
Uled as initial starting points: 28 
(1) As a general rule, parents are, in fact and in law, the principal 
decision-makers for the health care of their children. This principle is 
•ell established whether in natural or in constitutional law. Outside 
of the excepti~ns given below, their desires and wishes are to be 
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followed by all others as the general rule. 29 
(2) The physician(s) has (have) a legal and moral responsib .y to 
be open and truthful to the parents of defective neonates, ; soon 
after birth as possible. This calls for full disclosure and infor m con· 
sent on the part of parents at the earliest possible time aJ ·· the 
preliminary diagnosis has been established. All future medical ·lions 
should be outlined for the parents or guardian , including n \ oreat-
ment, risks, benefits, chance of success and the consequences . each 
medical procedure available. The objective of this is to give pan ·.s the 
fullest information and possible options available to them so t l . they 
can fully and knowingly consent to treatment or nontreatmen t 
(3) While it is difficult to determine always what " accepted r P.dical 
standards" are at any one t ime (what is ex traordinary today 1. ay be 
ordinary procedure tomorrow), the presumption is that the p h : ;;ician 
is acquainted with the ordinary standard of the profession . '.•deed, 
this is his obligation under the law as minimal competence . f non· 
treatment or treatment i,s within that range, the doctor may ( nmply 
with the parents' wishes. If the doctor is uncertain as to prognusis, he 
should consult another independent doctor, who is to perf,;rm an 
independent examination of the child. (By independent I m ean dis-
interested in the outcome, whether for research, transplant atwn, or 
for any other reason.) It would also be of great value in an y ;;.rea of 
doubt for the doctor to have an ethics committee which h e could 
consult, for decision diffusion, dispassion, and some expert input in 
this delicate matter. Such a committee could be composed o f a cross· 
section of prominent legal, medical, ethical and religious talent. "0 
(4) If the parents decide not to treat, and to permit the child to die, 
it is imperative that the doctor seek the independent evaluat ion of 
another disinterested doctor before he acquiesces in the desire of the 
parents (presuming, of course, that the course of action is supported 
by good and accepted medical standards). These standards will be 
discussed more inodetail in section 6. 
(5) If the doctor and the independent examining doctor conclude 
that nontreatment by the doctor is not in conformity with accept~ 
medical procedure, then the attending doctor must point .out th15 
situation to the parents and explain the reasons why this is so. If the 
parents insist on nontreatment, nonetheless, the doctor o r hospital 
administrator should not hesitate to petition a court of com petent 
jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian to consent to treat-
ment. 
(6) What are .the standards to be used not to treat? This is a difficult 
question because these standards are always evolving. Indeed , it is the 
very nature of medical progress that they do evolve, for the better. 
But, lacking any absolute legal standards, the following may be safely 
followed: 
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- Where death will come about imminently, no matter what we do, 
there is no legal or moral obligation to treat or to continue .t o treat, 
outside of basic procedures, to make the child comfortable. 31 
- Where there is no probable medical possibility - given our present 
· knowledge of medicine- of the child ever achieving any cognit ive 
or sapient stage of conscious realization, no treatment need be given 
(or commenced) nor need treatment be. continued, except to make 
the patient comfortable. The treatment is withheld here, not 
because the child is retarded (the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution applies to them as well) but because the treatment is 
medically and, therefore, humanly useless. Such a judgment is for 
the doctor(s) to make as good medical practice. Morally and legally, 
we are held to what is humanly possible now, not to what can or 
will happen sometime and somewhere down the historical road. 
- Where there is no probable medical possibility - given our present 
knowledge of medicine - of the child ever achieving any cognitive 
or sapient stage of conscious realization, no treatment need be given 
(commenced) nor need treatment be continued. Once again, we are 
held to what is humanly possible, not to what can or will happen 
SOmetime and somewhere down the historical road . 
- Many eminent authorities argue- and the author is in agreement 
on this point- that where the child has no reasonable possibility of 
ever being able to participate to any degree in human relationships 
With others, no treatment need be commenced nor treatment con-
. tinued, beyond basic comfort of the child. One should carefully 
know the limitation here: any degree of human relationship. This is 
an admittedly difficult concept to deal with because it has been so 
manipulated by the "quality of life" arguments for nontreatment of 
otherwise defective neonates. To erase all ambiguity, we must insist 
on this almost absolute "any" and this should be read in conjunc-
tion with the paragraph immediately preceding the present one. 
There will be close cases and, as we shall p'oint out later, all pre-
SUmptions should and must be resolved in favor of life and in favor 
of the young patient. With this said, there remain true cases of 
defective children where the brain is so under- or nondeveloped, 
that we can say, with a great deal of medical certitude, that this 
child has little or no hope of any human interaction. Once again, 
the judgment is a medical one and all presumptions should and 
Jnust be resolved in favor of the patient-child . 
..,. Where there is no medical possibility or probability of alleviating 
What reasonable medical judgment would consider to be an intoler-
able level of continued suffering, the same judgment should obtain 
118 in the above cases. Human intervention must be for the good of 
the patient (primum non nocere ), and if there is little probability 
that good will come about, then it is both futile and cruel to act 
further on this human being. 
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However, in this last condition, precisely because there i~· 
sion of the subj~ctive involved, another doctor, an ind, 




ethics committee, if one exists. This condition should alsl ·e seen 
in the light of good and accepted medical standards. 
(7) To alleviate the intolerable decision-making in such ~ 1arged 
and painfilled atmosphere, parents should be told that the qu. ion of 
long-term custody of the child can be settled later. This woL· ' allow 
them to consent to care at a crucial juncture, rather than fo .J them 
to participate in the child's death by nontreatment as the pr ·t of not 
assuming long-term custody. By emphasizing that the approp · t~e~ess 
of custody must be assessed continuously throughout the ch t 1 s l~e, 
the parents could more comfortably commit themselves to t ;,, child, 
one day at a time, without feeling boxed into the situation. 
(8) If the doctor concludes that treatment will be ineffe t :.·e, but 
the parents insist that it be undertaken, the doctor should acq l.· ;esce to 
these desires, as long as the treatment does no further harm no~· caus~s 
any further suffering to the child. It it does, the doctor sh r.~ uld, _m 
conscience, refuse to perform, and speak to the parents about obtam-
ing a different physician. . 
(9) Under no circumstances should an active agent, or o the~wlSe 
legal procedure, whose direct object is to either kill or help ter~mate 
the life of the child, be administered. Much here depends on the zntent 
of the doctor and medical personnel. No court of law can really con-
trol or regulate this. For instance, it is certainly legally and m~rallY 
permissible to administer a large quantity of a pain-killing drug, if t~e 
direct intent of the doctor is, in fact, to alleviate pain, even th ough It 
has, as an indirect effect, the shortening of the life of the patient. . 
(10) In all cases, basic comfort and care should be given. ThiS 
should include food and water in all but cases where it is actuallY 
painful for the child to receive even those. This should include 
warmth, loving, touching, sanitation. . 
(11) Above all, the major rule in the area is that treatment 1s to be 
withheld only in the clearest and most compelling cases of ho i?eless-
ness, using the above-mentioned safeguarding criteria. If there ~s ~ny 
doubt of this, it should be resolved in favor of the child, for .h lS lif~, 
and for his best interests. In other words, the presumption is always m 
favor of life and treatment and all doubts should be resolved in the 
child's favor. 
Conclusion 
The case of Baby Jane Doe of New York is important because it 
shows so clearly the pitfalls in this whole are~ of defective neonates{ 
The child was born severely retarded and w1th an operable case 0 
spina bifida. The prognosis was uncertain, but doctors seemed to agree 
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that with an operation, she might live to age 20; without it, to age two 
or less. The difficulty here is that the parents invoked privacy and 
have been able to block the federal government's request that it view 
the records to determine whether the operation is being denied 
· because she is retarded or for other reasons extrinsic to her retarda-
Uon. This would seem to be a quite normal case of civil rights investi-
ption (since Baby Jane has ho independent voice) on the part of 
aovernment under the law (Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 
were it not for the strange attitude of the parents, medical personnel 
and the courts, which prevents the government from determining facts 
of the case which it has a legal obligation to do. 
The limited purpose of rule 45 CFR Part 84 to be posted at the 
nurses' station, restricts itself to cases in which nutrition and custom-
ary medical care are discriminatorily withheld from certain infants 
10/ely because they are handicapped. This rule was made to enforce 
the clear intent of law 504 under which it is unlawful for a recipient 
of federal financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant 
nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to 
correct a life-threatening condition solely because he/she is handi-
e&pped and the handicap does not render treatment medically contra-
iodicated. In other words, both the law and the rule are consubstantial 
to the same end of safeguarding the civil rights of a helpless group of 
hutnans-in-being. For the reasons given supra, while the parents and 
cloctors are normally the ones to make medical decisions for their chil-
dren in life-threatening situations where the child is defective in some 
lerious way, the history of the past 20 years has shown clearly that 
1 lllch a child needs added protection to safeguard its basic civil rights. 
The argument of the medical community against the new rule is 
that it intrudes unnecessarily irito the privacy of parents and doctors 
in proper medical decisions. Yet, given the history of abuse which we 
bave outlined supra, the rule is a long overdue response to abuses by 
IOJne doctors who have exceeded their own professional authority by 
lllowing the withdrawal of medical treatment for nonmedical or 
ideological reasons (a life of a "quality" not worth living). These 
instances have been too well documented and too widely practiced to 
take this complaint by doctors and parents seriously. The law and the 
lllle are urgently needed. · 
Furthermore and in the same vein, the AMA's guidelines for defec-
tive infants and their treatment (1981) effectively deny the physi-
eiin's traditional role as advocate on behalf of his patient in such 
Cllles. They make him a mere consultant, allowing parents unlimited 
lllthority ro refuse life-saving treatment for their handicapped chil-
dren. These guidE>lines do not even intimate the legal and moral obliga-
tion of the physician to take legal action when the parents ' decision 
1rouid lead to neglect. Public Law 504 simply steps into a vacuum 
tleated by the medical profession itself which has shown itself to be 
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widely and seriously negligent in protecting these patients. This r ~hor 
has great difficulty in understanding the reasoning of the com . for 
striking this simple rule, posted in the nurses' station of fee cally 
funded hospitals. In fact, in this area of law, courts have bem nly 
compounding or condoning the crucial problem. 
The case of Baby Jane Doe contradicts many of the standa1 s we 
have established supra. Yet, if such standards were, in fact, fo] JWed 
by the medical profession, they would obviate the necessity of j uing 
rule 54 of Public Law 504. As the situation exists presently, wi 1 the 
decision of the courts not to enforce the rule, children such as '3aby 
Jane Doe have no independent advocates and are left to the art -:;rary 
vagaries of parents and a medical profession which have a. eady 
proven themselves quite neglectful in this delicate area. LegaL ', we 
have not seen a group of humans so powerless since Dredd Scot t. 
Further Developments 
More recently, the government has further modified its pre . osed 
rules.32 In these last suggested rules, the government has attemp •ed to 
modify criticism of rule 54 by mandating or encouraging the cr~ation 
of hospital ethics committees. Such committees were originally 
encouraged by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan 
decision 33 with which the guardian of Karen Quinlan had to consult 
before the removal of her life-sustaining equipment. Moreover, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, in its response to the federal rule 
54, recommended the establishment of a version of hospital ethics 
committees in place of hotlines and investigators: 
The Academy believes the creation of infant bioethical review committees 
constitutes a direct, effective, and appropriate means of addressing the ex ist· 
ing education and information gaps. 34 
In fact, the most recent study on these legal-ethical problems recom-
mends the establishment of such ethics committees.35 The most 
recent literature in the field, 36 as well as national conferences on the 
subject, 37 have taken up the theme as well. 
Can such ethics committees substitute adequately for rule 54 in 
living up to Public Law 504? . 
The arguments against the hotline and government agents descend· 
ing on health facilities have been well aired. 
Intervention by the government is always retrospective and does 
not by itself set up any standards for treatment or nontreatment . Such 
an information procedure is erratic at best and can easily be used to 
harrass and punish unpopular personnel. Such intervention causes 
consternation and has a chilling effect on physicians and the hospital 
and could easily poison the atmosphere of the unit as everyone begins 
to suspect everyone else. 
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Thus, in principle, we are reduced to three choices. 
- First, we could permit the status quo, letting the physician and 
the parents make these critical decisions. Yet, as we have seen, there 
have been too many cases where defective neonates have been 
· 4eprived of simple medical procedures (Infant Doe) simply because 
the child was retarded. If there are two universally accepted standards 
in this area, they are that 1) the principle that such decisions must be 
made in the best interest of the child and 2) that Down's Syndrome is 
not a justification for not treating an otherwise correctable, life-
threatening condition in a newborn. As we have also seen supra, in 
general, family autonomy and parental burden (it is parents who must 
bring up the child) must enjoy a presumption of decision-making. But 
the presumption should give way, particularly in situations like defec-
tive neonates, where the emotionality of the rapid decision can cloud 
judgment. In these edges-of-life decisions, parents and doctors need 
help. 
- Second, we could take these cases to court. Besides the inunda-
tion of cases which they would have to hear, courts are not particu-
larly better decision-makers in this area than anyone else . Of course, 
this does not rule out the role of courts- particularly in ambiguous 
areas where there is a clear disagreement between the doctor who 
COnsiders a particular procedure standard medical care under all the 
circumstances, and the parents. Intervention by the court in such a 
lituation is actually mandated. 
- Third, we could. espouse direct governmental intervention with 
IOJne of the drawbacks which we have cited supra. Can an ethics 
C0Jnmittee act as a tertium quid to respect parental autonomy while 
~tecting the civil rights of these children which the government is, 
by law, obligated to do? . 
The answer is uncertain because ethics committees have hot been 
C!lnployed to any large extent. 38 Such committees would be staffed 
l by a cross section of the community to represent as much as possible 
· the moral sense of the community itself. The ethics committee should 
be composed of personnel mostly independent of the institution so as 
to avoid any confliCt or" interest or conflict of loyalty (even, perhaps, 
Olle's employment). The purpose of the committee would not be to 
Iaake decisions on its own, but to be there on a consultative basis for 
the crucial ethical decisions to be used by all concerned. 
ln other words, the committee's function would be to help others 
llaake these crucial decisions or, in a real exception, to recommend to 
the health care facility, court action itself. The help of the committee 
COuld be used prospectively, that is, could be assembled and consulted 
by anyone having an interest in the case: medical or hospital per-
IOnnel, parents or guardian, the administration of the hospital or any 
llae!nber of the committee itself. Its records and testimony would be 
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confidential and could be turned over to third parties only b. 
order. 
The function of the committee would also be in retrot 
review of morally problematic decisions (there was some dout · 
whether nontreatment was morally justifiable). This kind of 
provides a forum to discuss how decisions could have bee 
better and how future cases could be better handled. In this se. 
committee's function logically leads to establishing institution 
cies for treatment/nontreatment decisions; it can also supp• 











Thus, the ethics committee; upon presentation of all the fa 1,s, can 
make an ethical decision on those edges of life which could .. d and 
strengthen the various parties who must make the essential d "~ision. 
The decision is not made by the committee, since its functk n is to 
help others make that vital decision. 
Of course, if treatment is clearly called for (e.g., a simple prc~'edure 
to open a fistula in an otherwise healthy Down's syndrome child who is 
being allowed to starve because he/she is retarded), the com mittee 
should not hesitate to recommend court proceedings if the parents 
refuse treatment. 
And if the child will die, no matter what aggressive treat ment is 
given, the parents' wishes not to treat further except to make t he child 
comfortable, should be respected by all concerned. 
Problem Becomes Crucial 
The problem for all (ethics committee, medical personnel, parents, 
hospital administrators) becomes crucial when the situation is ambig-
uous or in the "gray areas," already described in the body of this 
article. We have mentioned some principles already accepted univer· 
sally as good medical procedure: best interest of the child, parental 
autonomy and family privacy and its presumption, and the right to 
treatment for the physically and mentally handicapped in an other· 
wise treatable situation. It . is this gray area which causes difficulties 
and the ethics committee should provide all the help and enlighten· 
ment it can in these difficult areas when the situation does not other· 
wise clearly indicate treatment. If the committee believes that treat· 
ment is otherwise morally obligatory because it is consistent with 
ordinary or accepted medical procedure, and the parents refuse treat· 
ment, the committee should not hesitate to advise the hospital to take 
the case to court, where the ul~imate decision can be made in an 
adversarial process. 
While the function of such committees could be expanded to other 
areas of ethical decision-making (comatose and dying patients, nursing 
home care, cost analysis in the final stages of death, allocation of 
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scarce health resources), it should be noted that with such committees 
on hand and consulted, this would significantly reduce the dangers of 
malpractice. The reason is that such committees represent not only a 
. cross section of the community ("moral sense of the community"), 
they also tend to increase the level and standard of care which must be 
dearly shown to be absent in negligence actions. This is said only in 
passing, but it could be a practical incentive for "practical headed" 
administrators to at least give such committees a chance. 
Under appropriate circumstances, a bioethical hospital committee 
can therefore render value assistance to a health facility. The very least 
that can be said about them is their implacement would be better than 
what is presently available. 
The arguments for hospital ethics committees cited supra are only a 
beginning; as a society, we grapple together with these terrible pro b-
lems of life and death which modern technological medicine has 
bestowed on us. The question, like war, is too important for all of 
us to be left exclusively to the interested parties of parents (guardians) 
and doctors. Some independent person in these tragic situations must 
speak for the child who cannot speak. Hospital ethics committees can 
be the beginning of a badly needed dialogue between a worried public 
and the medical community. This in turn will come, in its own way, to 
influence "accepted medical standards," at least in the long run. After 
all, medicine is as much an art as it is a science and therefore moral 
and ethical values are crucial in medical decision-making. A wider 
moral and ethical input can only help the medical community 
morally, psychologically, and legally. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age 
Michael Novak 
Thomas Nelson, Nashville, Tenn., 1983, 144 pp., $3.95. 
The present booklet is a collection of articles on nuclear warfare by Mi_cha~l 
Novak most of which were previously published in various journals. The title IS 
borro~ed from the most important article in the booklet, which takes the form of 
a letter from Catholic clergy and laity on nuclear warfare . Although written by 
Novak, it was signed by more than a hundred Catholic clergy and laymen. !he 
letter was motivated by concern about the earlier drafts of the recent Amencan 
bishops' statement on war and peace. Although the final dra~t of the bish?p~' 
atatement took a position not too distant from that found m the letter, It 1s 
helpful to see the approach of the letter to the problem . _ _ 
While the letter recognizes the unique problem ra1sed by the discovery of 
nuclear weapons , it also calls attention to the fact that this is not the first time 
Christians have confronted the apocalyptic question. It is also reluctant to look at 
the whole issue in terms of the worst possible scenario. So it is more hesitant, 
then about the condemnation of any use of nuclear weapons than the bishops' 
state'ment seemed to be. The bishops expressed themselves highly skeptical about 
any use of nuclear weapons . 
. Equal concern was shown in the Novak letter for the threat t~at comes from 
the Marxist camp and the danger of blackmail arising from any d1splay of weak-
ness. 
On the issue of deterrence, the letter takes a stronger position than the bishops. 
Again the fears of the bishops are more on the side of the arms race, and ~he 
dange~s inherent in it. The letter focuses more on the risks involved in weake~mg 
one's deterrence capabilities. Although aware of these risks, I would have to_ d1ffer 
with the Jetter on the question of intention in reference to deterrence. Wh1le not 
allowing actual use, the letter considers the intention to use such _w~apons ~ 
necessary element of deterrence. This goes contrary to the whole Chnshan tradi-
tion in which sin begins in the intention. _ 
There must obviously be some intention behind the possessiOn of nuclear 
weapons. Otherwise, they would not even exist. The intention may and _m':lst go as 
far as use for deterrence. ·In fact, it may even go so far as actual use w~thm moral 
limits. But even if one were to hold that no actual use could be m~ral , and 
therefore would allow no intention of actual use, I do not see ho~ th1s ;would 
inhibit or weaken deterrence. In other words, I do not see why the mtentlon of 
actual use should be considered necessary for the effectiveness of a deterrent. 
Since intention is strictly internal, it is hard to see how it can have any external 
impact in itself. The threat comes from actual possession of the weapons. As lo~g 
II a country possesses such weapons, the enemy countr~ will _feel a thr~at. Th1s 
Will remain true even if a country insists it has no mtentwn of usmg such 
weapons. But it must be admitted that Novak becomes a little ambiguous about 
the kind of intention about which he is speaking. . 
In the second article, Novak views the confrontation between the Umte~ St~tes 
llld the Soviet Union as it appears to Europeans. After World War II until fairly 
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